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The Invasion of Sexual Privacy
ALI KHAN*
In Bowers v. Hardwick, the United States Supreme Court held
constitutional a Georgia statute which outlaws sodomy, as applied
to homosexuals, but expressed no opinion as to the constitutional-
ity of the statute as applied to heterosexuals. Professor Khan ar-
gues that Hardwick's case presented a simple right to privacy is-
sue, which the Court twisted into a moral one. The Article
concludes that homosexuals were singled out for moral condemna-
tion at the expense of a fundamental liberty.
INTRODUCTION
In a recent case, Bowers v. Hardwick,1 the United States Supreme
Court ruled five to four that the federal constitution does not confer
a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy. Fur-
ther, a state may criminalize homosexual sodomy even if it is prac-
ticed among consenting adults in the privacy of a home. The Georgia
statute challenged before the Court outlaws all forms of sodomy, and
under its broad language it is legally irrelevant whether the persons
who engage in sodomy are homosexuals or heterosexuals, married or
unmarried.2 The Court, in ruling that the statute is constitutional as
* Associate Professor of Law, Washburn University. M.A., 1972, LL.B., 1976,
Punjab University; LL.M. 1980, J.S.D., 1983, New York University. The author is
grateful to Professors Bill Rich, David Ryan and Myrl Duncan for their helpful
comments.
1. 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986), reh'g denied, slip op. 85-140 (Sept. II, 1986).
2. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2002 (Harrison 1983) provides:
(a) A person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or submits to
any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of
another ....
(b) A person convicted of the offense of sodomy shall be punished for not less
applied to homosexuals, expressed no opinion on its constitutionality
as applied to other acts of sodomy.3 Justice White, writing for the
majority, gave two distinct reasons to deny a fundamental right to
engage in homosexual sodomy. First, the right of privacy pronounced
in prior Court cases does not extend to homosexual sodomy. Second,
homosexual sodomy is not a fundamental liberty deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and tradition;5 nor is it a fundamental right
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."6
This Article criticizes the majority opinion. It argues that the ma-
jority ignored the issue the case presented, and that the decision
reached is analytically indefensible. Further, it is submitted that the
reasons advanced by the Court are based on legally unacceptable
rhetoric and discarded historical morality. It is unfortunate that by
invoking notions of muddled morality to resolve an otherwise clear
legal question, the Court has made bad law out of a simple case.
One can only hope, as Justice Blackmun said in his dissent, that "the
Court soon will reconsider its analysis and conclude that depriving
individuals of the right to choose for themselves how to conduct their
intimate relationships poses a far greater threat to the values most
deeply rooted in our Nation's history than tolerance of nonconform-
ity could ever do.
' 7
THE TWISTED ISSUE
Formulating issues carefully and correctly is not only essential for
fair resolution of disputes but it is also indispensable for good and
honest legal analysis. The dissenting Justices rightly point out that
the majority distorted the question the case presented.8 The issue
before the Court was not the morality of homosexual sodomy or, for
that matter, the morality of sodomy in general. Nor was the issue
whether the Constitution confers upon homosexuals a fundamental
right to engage in sodomy. There was little need to frame the issue
in morally stark language, much less to embrace the notion that
than one nor more than 20 years ....
3. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2842 n.2. John and Mary Doe, a heterosexual
couple, also joined Hardwick as plaintiffs, stating that they wished to engage in sodomy
in the privacy of their home, and that they had been "chilled and deterred" from engag-
ing in such sexual activity by both the existence of the statute and Hardwick's arrest.
The District Court held that the couple lacked the proper standing to maintain the action
because they had neither sustained, nor were in immediate danger of sustaining any di-
rect injury from the enforcement of the statute. The Court of Appeals upheld this judg-
ment. Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202 (1 1th Cir. 1985). The couple did not chal-
lenge the holding in the Supreme Court.
4. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2844.
5, Id. at 2844-46.
6. Id. at 2844, 2846.
7. Id. at 2856 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
8. Id. at 2848.
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"majority sentiments about the morality of homosexuality"9 are ade-
quate to validate the statute. Rhetoric based on popular sentiments
serves political ends well, but not the interests of justice. This Socra-
tes taught us centuries ago.'0
Writing for four members of the Court, Justice Blackmun, in dis-
sent, seems to have been indeed careful to separate sentimental mo-
rality from the legal issue before the Court. Avoiding "the Court's
almost obsessive focus on homosexual activity,"11 he frames the issue
in terms of whether "Hardwick has stated a cognizable claim that
[the Georgia statute] interferes with constitutionally protected inter-
ests in privacy and freedom of intimate association." 2 This formula-
tion of the issue, unlike that of the majority's, does not provoke any
raw sentiments that one might have against sodomy in general, and
homosexuals in particular. It allows analysis of the issue with an un-
biased deliberation.
By focusing exclusively upon a twisted issue, the majority creates
a classification that an indiscriminate statute does not contemplate.
That is, the statute at issue is designed to punish sexual acts involv-
ing the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another; it
is not aimed at prohibiting exclusively homosexual activity."3 The
statute does not raise the question of whether the persons engaged in
anal or oral sex are homosexuals or heterosexuals, married or un-
married. These classifications are unnecessary precisely because the
statute focuses upon the act of sodomy, not upon the social identity
of sodomites.
To argue that the statute is applicable to a certain group of sod-
omites, but not to others, amounts to rewriting the statute, which the
Court does not pretend to do. Nor does the Court give reasons to
show why a selective application of the statute is justified. Justice
Stevens said:
Either the persons to whom Georgia seeks to apply its statute do not have
the same interest in 'liberty' that others have, or there must be a reason
why the State may be permitted to apply a generally applicable law to cer-
tain persons that it does not apply to others.'
4
One might appreciate the skillful generosity of a court when it
9. Id. at 2846.
10. PLATO, GORGIAS (W. Hamilton trans. 1960); see also J. WHITE, WHEN
WORDS LosE THEIR MEANING (1984).
11. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2849.
12. Id. at 2850.
13. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2002 (Harrison 1983).
14. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2858 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
construes a statute to confer a special benefit upon a socially disad-
vantaged group.1 5 It is unsettling jurisprudence, however, when a
court construes a criminal statute to inflict special harm upon a po-
litically weak group.' 6 Fairness demands that a criminal statute not
be selectively applied in a manner that singles out a particular group
and then exposes it to the full wrath of a statute designed to be ap-
plicable to all. A discriminate enforcement of a criminal statute
against a socially disfavored group is bad jurisprudence;'7 especially
in a legal system that distinguishes itself on grounds of democratic
equality and individual liberty.
Although the Court did not express its opinion on the constitution-
ality of the statute as applied to heterosexual adults, one may infer
that the Court deliberately avoided formulating the issue as focusing
upon sodomy in general. Justice Stevens, in his incisive dissent, cor-
rectly pointed out that under the ruling of Griswold v. Connecticut,'
a state may not prohibit sodomy within the "sacred precincts of mar-
ital bedrooms."19 Likewise, any such prohibition among unmarried
heterosexual adults would be equally unconstitutional under the pro-
15. Justice White, who wrote the majority opinion in Hardwick, made an inter-
esting argument in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), to show that the Con-
necticut anticontraceptive statutes violated the fourteenth amendment because they de-
nied "disadvantaged citizens of Connecticut, those without either adequate knowledge or
resources to obtain private counseling, access to medical assistance and up-to-date infor-
mation in respect to proper methods of birth control." Griswold, 381 U.S. at 503 (White,
J., concurring)(emphasis added).
16. In United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76 (1820), Chief Justice
Marshall stated: "The rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly is perhaps not
much less old than construction itself. It is founded on the tenderness of the law for the
rights of individuals. . . ." Id. at 93. In McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25 (1931),
the Court narrowly construed the term "motor vehicle" and held that the National Mo-
tor Vehicle Theft Act did not apply to airplanes. Justice Holmes said: "Although it is not
likely that a criminal will carefully consider the text of the law before he murders or
steals, it is reasonable that a fair warning should be given to the world in language that
the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is
passed." Id. at 27. In Johnson v. Southern Pac. Co., 196 U.S. 1 (1904), the Court re-
fused to construe a statute strictly because such a narrow construction would limit its
remedial aspect.
17. In Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964), the South Carolina Su-
preme Court had upheld the conviction of black demonstrators who sat in a restaurant
booth that barred blacks from being served. The statute at issue made it a misdemeanor
to enter lands of another after notice from the owner prohibiting entry. The court con-
strued the statute to cover not only the act of entry on the premises after receiving notice
not to enter, but also the act of remaining on the premises after receiving the notice to
leave. Except by way of a judicial enlargement, there was nothing in the statute to indi-
cate that it also prohibited the act of remaining on the premises after being asked to
leave. The United States Supreme Court struck down the principle that a judicial en-
largement of a criminal statute can be applied retroactively. This case shows how the
Supreme Court has traditionally rejected unfair enforcement of criminal statutes. See
also Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
18. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
19. 106 S. Ct. at 2858 (citing Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485).
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tection of Eisenstadt v. Baird.S0 The Court's narrow focus upon ho-
mosexual sodomy indicates in .itself that it would be constitutionally
difficult to uphold a statute that invades the bedrooms of heterosex-
ual adults.
Hardwick relied upon the prior cases to assert that the conduct
prohibited by the Georgia statute falls within the boundaries of pro-
tected privacy. But the Court rejected this argument, and concluded
that the rights pronounced in the prior cases do not extend to homo-
sexual sodomy. It distinguished the present case from the prior cases
on tht ground that "none of the rights announced in those cases
bears any resemblance to the claimed constitutional right of homo-
sexuals to engage in acts of sodomy ...." All the prior cases, the
Court stated, protect family, marriage, or procreation, but not homo-
sexual activity; and, therefore, the present case had no connection
with the prior cases.22
The connection that the Court did not see, however, was visible to
four dissenting members of the Court who were willing to look below
the surface of the prior cases. They saw that the common thread
that ties together the rights protected in the prior cases is the con-
cept of privacy. The Constitution protects an individual's decisions
regarding marriage,23 procreation, 24 contraception,
25 and abortion 21
primarily because these decisions, made within the bounds of pri-
vacy, constitute the core of an individual's life.27 These rights, there-
fore, protect in a fundamental way vital private decisions of individu-
als and not merely stereotypical households.
28
Thus, the rights protected in the prior cases, considering that they
all are essential manifestations of privacy, bear a close resemblance
to the claimed right to engage in homosexuality. There is, however,
20. 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); see also Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2858 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). In fact, the Court recently denied certiorari in a state court decision holding
unconstitutional an Oklahoma "Crimes Against Nature" statute which had been applied
to heterosexual acts of sodomy. Post v. State, 715 P.2d 1105, reh'g denied, 717 P.2d
1151, cert. denied sub nom. Oklahoma v. Post, 107 S. Ct. 200 (1986) (moral repugnance
does not create a compelling justification for state invasion of a privacy interest, citing
Eisenstadt and Griswold).
21. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2844.
22. Id.
23. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
24. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
25. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965).
26. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
27. 106 S. Ct. at 2851 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
28. Id.
no common bond even among the protected rights. Procreation, for
example, bears no resemblance to abortion. Likewise, the right of
unmarried couples to use contraceptives has no connection with child
rearing and education. 29 The Court's focus upon specific rights
rather than privacy obscures the reason for which these rights are
protected. For if the string of privacy is broken, these distinct rights
will scatter.
Even assuming that the Court's line of reasoning is valid, a close
analogy exists between the protected right of the unmarried couples
to use contraceptives3" and the claimed right to engage in homosexu-
ality. First, the right to use contraceptives implies that individuals
may engage in nonprocreational sexual conduct. Thus, heterosexual
activity with the use of contraceptives is similar to acts of homosexu-
ality insofar as both types of sexuality are nonreproductive. Second,
both heterosexuals and homosexuals may use contraceptive devices
essentially for the same purpose, that is, to avoid sexually transmit-
ted diseases. Hence, while it might be conceded that the claimed
right to engage in homosexuality does not promote procreation, mar-
riage, or family, neither does the protected right of unmarried
couples to use contraceptives.
As the Court refused to see these connections between the rights
protected in the previous line of cases and the claimed right in Hard-
wick, it is apparent that the Court did not carefully scrutinize the
intrinsic nature of these related privacy rights. It seems as if the
Court has concluded that constitutionally protected privacy rights
can be exercised by heterosexuals only. There is no constitutional
basis for treating homosexuals with unjustified contempt by com-
pletely denying them the right of privacy - "the most comprehen-
sive of rights and the right most valued by civilized man."31
This unequal treatment of homosexuals is not only regrettable, but
will be hard to justify under the fourteenth amendment. In Skinner
v. Oklahoma,32 the Court held unconstitutional a statute that au-
thorized the sterilization of persons previously convicted of larceny
but not those convicted of embezzlement. Rejecting this artificial
distinction between intrinsically similar crimes, the Court mandated
29. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
30. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
31. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
32. 316 U.S. 535 (1942); see also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (vote-
diluting discrimination caused by reapportionment); Mclaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184
(1964) (statute prohibiting interracial couple from living in same room); Harper v. Vir-
ginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (invalidating poll tax); United States v.
Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973) (holding that filing fees deny indigents equal protection ac-
cess to court system); United States v. Thompson, 452 F.2d 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (dis-
criminatory classifications in statutes subject to strictest possible review).
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strict scrutiny of a classification that treats unequally those who
commit offenses that are essentially the same. This unequal treat-
ment by the state, the Court further said, "[was] as invidious a dis-
crimination as if it had selected a particular race or nationality for
oppressive treatment.
'3 3
The Skinner holding undermines the distinction the Hardwick
Court draws between homosexual sodomy and heterosexual sodomy.
Such a distinction violates the Equal Protection Clause not only be-
cause it treats unequally sexual acts that are essentially the same,
but more importantly, because it singles out homosexuals for oppres-
sive treatment.
Nonetheless, the Court refused to grant any relief under the Equal
Protection Clause because the respondent had failed to specifically
invoke it in the courts below.3 4 Even if it is conceded that such re-
fusal is maintainable on technical grounds, the question remains
whether the Court itself, by creating an artificial and indefensible
distinction between homosexual and heterosexual sodomy, can em-
ploy a course of legal reasoning that squarely conflicts with the letter
and spirit of this most significant clause of the Constitution. 5 It is
submitted that when a court refuses to grant relief under the Equal
Protection Clause on the ground of failure to invoke it below, the
court is still under a constitutional obligation to reject a line of legal
reasoning which in itself violates the Clause. Given that the court
has limited its analysis of an issue to a specific clause of the Consti-
tution does not mean that the court is now free to throw away the
entrenched constraints of those clauses of the Constitution which are
not now before the court.3 6
Likewise, the Court declined to consider the eighth amendment
issue because the respondent did not specifically raise it below.37 The
Georgia statute authorizes a court to imprison a person for up to
twenty years for a single consensual act of sodomy, even if the act is
done within the private setting of a home. In the words of Justice
33. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
34. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2846 n.8.
35. In People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947
(1980), the New York Court of Appeals rejected the distinction between heterosexual
sodomy and homosexual sodomy and stated: "[B]ecause [the statute] permits the same
conduct between persons married to each other without sanction, we agree [that outlaw-
ing homosexual sodomy] violates ...the right to equal protection of the laws guaran-
teed them by the United States Constitution." Id. at 485, 415 N.E.2d at 938-39, 434
N.Y.S.2d at 949.
36. See infra text accompanying notes 109-13.
37. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2846 n.8.
Powell, who otherwise joined the opinion of the Court, this unusual
punishment creates "a serious Eighth Amendment issue."38 He also
noted the "moribund character" of laws that criminalize such pri-
vate, consensual conduct.39 More than half of the states have re-
pealed similar statutes, and the others that still have them on the
books have shown little interest in their enforcement.40 Even in
Georgia, the statute has not been enforced for several decades.4'
In view of these facts brought out by Justice Powell, it is not clear
why he joined the majority if the only practical effect of the decision
was to make an abstract moral statement out of a socially dead law.
Further, if legal officials have little interest in the enforcement of
sodomy statutes, it follows that these laws represent norms of mori-
bund morality. In fact, nonenforcement of these statutes suggests
that society tolerates homosexuality, and that the statutes have
failed to take into account the changes in notions of contemporary
morality. This, Justice Powell might have noticed, weakens the
Court's argument that the law "is constantly based on notions of
morality.
'42
Even though sodomy statutes are not generally enforced, the
Court's ruling legitimizes moral condemnation of homosexuality.
This moral condemnation will surely intensify discrimination that al-
ready exists against homosexuals in matters of housing and jobs. In-
deed, it will be ironic if the Hardwick rule generates a new wave of
discrimination against homosexuals while the sodomy statutes re-
main unenforced.
From a sociological viewpoint, what perhaps is more disturbing is
the unintended hypocrisy the majority decision would generate
among some members of the community. Now even heterosexual
sodomites, hostile to homosexuality, would have a legal excuse to
chide homosexual sodomites. Surely, it was not difficult for the
Court to foresee that the decision would reinforce, if not encourage,
double standards in the community.
ROOTS OF SEXUAL PRIVACY
What was at stake in this case was not the morality of a moribund
statute, but the right to sexual privacy. Rights of privacy pronounced
in prior cases are not explicitly mentioned in the text of the Consti-
tution.4 3 The creation of new rights, the Court says, does not depend
38. "Id. at 2847 (Powell, J., concurring).
39. Id. at 2848 n.2.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 2846.
43. Id.
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merely upon "the justices' own choice of values."" Thus, the Court
correctly points out that even though it is equally indefensible to
deny a right because it offends the Justices' personal sense of moral-
ity, there must be some principled method to declare rights that can-
not be directly derived from the language and design of the Consti-
tution.45 The Court recognized two criteria to identify the nature of
rights that qualify for heightened judicial protection. First, a right is
fundamental if it is deeply rooted in the history and tradition of our
nation.46 Second, a right is fundamental if it is implicit in the con-
cept of ordered liberty.""
This section discusses the first criterion, as outlined in Moore v.
East Cleveland,4 and argues that the right to sexual privacy is
rooted in all civilized traditions including that of the United States.
However, one caveat is necessary. The mere fact that a right has
been historically denied does not justify its continued denial. 49 For
instance, black children were denied for centuries the right to attend
integrated public schools. 0 History and tradition do not always yield
44. Id. at 2844.
45. Id. In Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians, 106 S. Ct. 2169
(1986), Justice White, writing for the four dissenting members of the Court, said:
[T]his Court does not subscribe to the simplistic view that Constitutional inter-
pretation can possibly be limited to the 'plain meaning' of the Constitution's
text or to the subjective intention of the Framers .... In particular, the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which forbids the deprivation of
'life, liberty, or property without due process of law,' has been read by the
majority of the Court to be broad enough to provide substantive protection
against State infringement of a broad range of individual interests.
Id. at 2193-94 (White, J., dissenting).
46. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2844-46.
47. Id.
48. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
49. Due process has not been reduced to any formula; its content cannot be
determined by reference to any code. The best that can be said is that through
the course of this Court's decisions it has represented the balance which our
Nation, built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual, has
struck between that liberty and the demands of organized society. If the supply-
ing of content to this Constitutional concept has of necessity been a rational
process, it certainly has not been one where judges have felt free to roam where
unguided speculation might take them. The balance of which I speak is the
balance struck by this country, having regard to what history teaches are the
traditions from which it developed as well as the traditions from which it broke.
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)(emphasis added); see
also Holmes, The Path of Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897). Holmes stated that:
[lit is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was
laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon
which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists
from blind imitation of the past.
50. But see Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
a satisfactory theory to identify rights. Nonetheless, this inquiry may
provide useful insight into the dynamics of social values.
The need for privacy is rooted in the very definition of a human
being. While monks might need seclusion for meditation, and, in-
deed, for resolving issues of morality, people in general need privacy
for more mundane activity.5' Individuals often crave for privacy so
they can be alone with someone they love. Privacy nurtures sexual
intimacy - a key relationship of human existence central to the de-
velopment of human personality.52 This yearning to be alone for inti-
mate love is not prompted by an urge to engage only and always in
reproductive sexual conduct. In fact, human beings develop intense
and enduring personal relationships primarily because they possess
the capacity for delightful sexuality not necessarily tied to the pro..
creative function.53
Any governmental intrusion, therefore, that affects intimate
human bonds must be viewed with great suspicion.5 Only under ex-
ceptional circumstances can the government justify regulating
human choices regarding how love ought to be expressed and to
whom. The mere breach of conventional sexual morality55 does not
constitute an exceptional circumstance. Thus, in Loving v. Virginia,5
the Court held unconstitutional the statutes that prohibited mar-
riages between whites and blacks. By making interracial marriage
illegal, these statutes had failed to appreciate that individuals can
develop sexually and emotionally fulfilling relationships even across
51. Brandeis & Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
About a century ago, the authors recognized the right to privacy in the following words:
The design of the law must be to protect those persons with whose affairs the
community has no legitimate concern, from being dragged into an undesirable
and undesired publicity and to protect all persons, whatsoever; their position or
station, from having matters which they may properly prefer to keep private,
made public against their will.
Id. at 214-15.
52. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slayton, 413 U.S. 49, 63 (1973); see also Carey v.
Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977).
53. 1. EiBL-EIBSFELDT, LOVE AND HATE 155-69 (1972). See generally ARIS-
TOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, BOOK VIII.
54. See generally A. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY (1971); Parker, A Defi-
nition of Privacy, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 275 (1974).
55. Professor Hart distinguishes between positive morality and critical morality.
While positive morality constitutes moral norms actually accepted and shared by a given
social group, critical morality evaluates the existing social institutions including the
norms of positive morality. If norms of positive morality allow, for example, the persecu-
tion of a racial or religious minority, critical morality would justify the disintegration of
such norms of positive morality. Thus any claim to enforce norms of positive morality
cannot be justified by simply showing that the majority accepts and shares these norms.
These norms must be justified under the principles of critical morality. See H. HART,
LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY 18-24 (1966). Professor Dworkin makes a similar dis-
tinction. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 53 (1977).
56. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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traditionally forbidden boundaries.5"
The individual interest in privacy becomes especially fundamental
in an American culture that thrives on diversity and protects individ-
ual liberty. An essential feature of individual liberty is self-respect.
As defined by John Rawls, self-respect is a "person's sense of his
own value, his secure conviction that his conception of his good, his
plan of life, is worth carrying out."' 8 Thus, any defensible concept of
individual liberty recognizes "a privacy interest with reference to
certain decisions that are properly for the individual to make."5 It
rejects state paternalism that imposes unjustified restrictions on indi-
vidual choices, especially in the sphere of human love and intimate
relationships. "[A] necessary corollary of giving individuals freedom
to choose how to conduct their lives is acceptance of the fact that
different individuals will make different choices." 60 It is the "Ameri-
can heritage of freedom . . . that makes certain state intrusions on
the citizen's right to decide how he will live his own life
intolerable."6
This right of privacy rooted in American history and tradition, not
sodomy, much less homosexual sodomy, was at issue in Hardwick.
By invoking the right of privacy, Hardwick was not asking the Court
to declare that sodomy is a fundamental right, but only that such
57. H. HART, supra note 55, at 18-22.
58. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 440 (1971).
[S]elf-respect implies a confidence in one's ability, so far as it is within one's
power, to fulfill one's intentions. When we feel that our plans of life are of little
value, we cannot pursue them with pleasure or take delight in their execution.
Nor plagued by failure and self-doubt can we continue in our endeavors. It is
clear then why self-respect is a primary good. Without it nothing may seem
worth doing . . . .All desire and activity becomes empty and vain, and we
sink into apathy and cynicism.
Id.
In Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), the Court seems to uphold the notion of
self-respect when it stated that:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the
pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual na-
ture, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain,
pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They
sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and
their sensations.
Id. at 564-65, (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting)).
59. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2850 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 2852.
61. Fitzgerald v. Porter Memorial Hosp., 523 F.2d 716, 719 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 916 (1976); see also Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2858 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
conduct falls within the precincts of privacy. Further, Hardwick did
not ask the Court even to approve of sodomy, but simply to ignore it
as protected private conduct. In other words, Hardwick attacked the
constitutionality of the statute not to prove that the sexual conduct
watched by the Georgia policeman is a fundamental liberty, but to
show that the state has no defensible excuse to watch people per-
forming sexual intercourse in the privacy of their homes.
The Court, however, neglected to consider the issues of privacy the
case presented, and proceeded to condemn homosexual sodomy. Of
course, the Court is correct in saying that sodomy is not deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition. But this line of analysis
must fail because neither using contraceptives,6 2 nor obtaining abor-
tion, 8 nor viewing obscene materials within the precincts of pri.-
vacy 64 is rooted in our Nation's history or tradition. These acts are
tolerated because they constitute essential manifestations of an an-
cient right, the right to privacy.
It is submitted that the right of sexual privacy is not only rooted
in human history and tradition, but also in the biological origins of
human beings. Studies of animal behavior show that our instinctive
desire for privacy derives from our evolutionary heritage.6 5 Human
beings are not the only ones who seek privacy; all living creatures do.
When monkeys fear a possible invasion within their private borders,
they shriek to scare off the intruders.6  African antelopes and Ameri-
can dairy cattle space themselves to establish private zones.6 7 When
rats are overly crowded in cages, they become aggressive, fight and
indulge in sadistic sexual conduct.68 Animals seek privacy for seclu-
sion as well as for playing, hiding, copulating and developing small-
group intimacy;6 9 so do human beings.
The desire for privacy in general and sexual privacy in particular
exists in all societies. Human beings in general copulate in privacy.
Only in a few cultures do people perform the sexual act in public.70
62. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1978); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965).
63. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians, 106 S. Ct. 2169 (1986);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
64. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
65. A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 8 (1967).
66. Id. "Studies of territoriality have even shattered the romantic notion that
when robins sing or monkeys shriek, it is solely for the 'animal joy of life.' Actually, it is
often a defiant cry for privacy, given within the borders of the animal's territory to warn
off possible intruders." Id. (footnotes omitted).
67. Id.; see also R. ARDREY. THE TERRITORIAL IMPERATIVE (1966).
68. A. WESTIN, supra note 65, at 9.
69. Id.; see also E. HALL, THE HIDDEN DIMENsION (1966).
70. A. WESTIN, supra note 65, at 14. Formosans and Yapes of the Pacific perform
sexual acts openly in public. "Even here, Formosans will not have intercourse if children
are present, and Yapes couples are secluded when intercourse takes place, though they
do not seem to mind the presence of other persons who may come on the scene." Id. at
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Even in the so-called primitive cultures, the need for privacy is
equally imperative. Among the Siriono Indians of Eastern Bolivia,
for example, due to overcrowding in huts, the sexual intercourse
takes place "more often in some secluded nook in the forest.""1
Human beings need privacy not only to engage in activity gener-
ally approved by the community, but also to protect intimate per-
sonal secrets which, if exposed, "would leave [them] naked to ridi-
cule and shame."'7 2 Every individual feels the need to conduct some
activities behind the veil of privacy. This private activity is impera-
tive for physical relaxation, mental health and indeed for the devel-
opment of individual personality.7 3 Numerous suicides and nervous
breakdowns resulting from forced governmental intrusions "con-
stantly remind a free society that only grave social need can ever
justify destruction of the privacy which guards the individual's ulti-
mate autonomy." 74
ORDERED LIBERTY
If the text of the Constitution does not directly recognize a funda-
mental right, the Court may pronounce the existence of such a right
if it is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. 75 This principle,
declared by Justice Cardozo in Palko v. Connecticut,78 was designed
to incorporate some provisions of the Bill of Rights into the four-
teenth amendment. Even though this principle has been invoked to
invalidate state procedures that violate notions of the "Anglo-Ameri-
can regime of ordered liberty, ' 77 its reach is not purely procedural.
On its basis, even the substance of state laws has been struck down.7 8
The thesis that the full scope of liberty goes beyond the specific
14-15.
71. Id. at 15.
72. Id. at 33.
Each person is aware of the gap between what he wants to be and what he
actually is, between what the world sees of him and what he knows to be his
much more complex reality. In addition, there are aspects of himself that the
individual does not fully understand but is slowly exploring and shaping as he
develops. Every individual lives behind a mask in this manner; indeed, the first
etymological meaning of the word 'person' was 'mask', indicating both the con-
scious and expressive presentation of the self to a social audience.
Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 34.
75. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2844.
76. 302 U.S. 319 (1932).
77. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 569 (1978).
78. Id.
guarantees provided in the Constitution is fully alive and well.79 In
Griswold v. Connecticut,0 three Justices agreed that the unmen-
tioned right of privacy is imbedded in the concept of liberty, invok-
ing, as a rule of construction, the ninth amendment, which provides
that "[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the peo-
ple." 8' In Roe v. Wade, 2 all nine Justices "accepted the Court's role
in giving the fourteenth amendment due process clause substantive
content beyond the Bill of Rights, despite significant disagreement
over exactly how the role should be performed. 83
Philosophically, the substantive elements of ordered liberty are
elusive.8' Even though the concept of ordered liberty is susceptible to
differing interpretations depending on the imagination and value
choices of the interpreter, the conduct prohibited by the Georgia
statute falls within the boundaries of ordered liberty.
Ordered liberty in a pluralistic, democratic society is founded
neither upon an officially pronounced state ideology, nor always upon
majoritarian sentiments."8 In essence, ordered liberty is a concept
that strikes a balance between individual liberty and social order.
Historically, the interests of the unelected rulers and the sentiments
of the majority have been the traditional foes of individual liberty.8"
As John Stuart Mill clarified, even in a democracy where rulers are
elected and the legislature is accountable to the community, the limi-
tation of the power of the government over individuals does not lose
its importance.87 The concept of ordered liberty as a scale to mea-
sure the importance of individual liberty against the needs of social
order, therefore, remains a powerful tool to limit both the authority
of the magistrate and the majority.88
79. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 230 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting):
"Of course, law is essential to the exercise and enjoyment of individual liberty in a com-
plex society. But it is not the source of liberty, and surely not the exclusive source." The
majority opinion of Justice Brennan in Smith v. Org. of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816
(1977), quoted with approval Justice Stevens' formulation of individual liberty. "The
liberty interest in family privacy has its source ... not in state law, but in intrinsic
human rights." Id. at 845.
80. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Justice Goldberg, concurring in an opinion joined by
Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan, rooted the right of privacy in the concept of
liberty. Id. at 488-93.
81. U.S. CONsT. amend. IX.
82. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
83. L, TRIBE, supra note 77, at 572.
84. Id. at 572-73. Professor Tribe argues that none of the theories offered to sup-
port fundamental rights are wholly satisfying. References to history, tradition, and the
concept of ordered liberty provide useful insights, but do not yield a satisfactory model to
identify these rights.
85. Id. at 893.
86. J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 3-19 (C. Shields ed. 1956).
87. Id. at 6.
88. Id. at 7.
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The fundamental principle animating the fourth amendment pro-
tection, for example, safeguards the privacy and security of individu-
als against arbitrary invasions by government officials.89 The require-
ment of a search warrant upon determination of probable cause
strikes a balance between the "too precious" 90 character of privacy
and the state's interest in arresting criminals.91 Further, the fourth
amendment limits the authority of government because "[h]istory
shows that all officers tend to be officious." 92
But individual protection against the excesses of governmental offi-
cials is not enough. Individuals, in order to freely define their iden-
tity and choose suitable lifestyles, also need protection against the
imposition of majoritarian sentiments. 93 Thus, ordered liberty as a
principle is not only useful in balancing individual liberty against
state interests but also individual freedom against collective moral-
Protection, therefore, against the tyranny of the magistrate is not enough: there
needs protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling;
against the tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil penalties,
its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them;
to fetter the development, and, if possible, prevent the formation, of any indi-
viduality not in harmony with its ways, and compel all characters to fashion
themselves upon the model of its own. There is a limit to the legitimate inter-
ference of collective opinion with individual independence: and to find that
limit, and maintain it against encroachment, is as indispensable to a good con-
dition of human affairs, as protection against political despotism.
Id.
89. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967). In Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438 (1928), rev'd, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967), Justice Brandeis, in his dissent,
warned us against the unbridled use of discretion by governmental officials:
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the
Government's purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert
to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to
liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but with-
out understanding.
Id. at 479 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
90. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948).
91. Id. at 455.
92. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 382 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting), rev'd,
387 U.S. 523, 528 (1966).
93. S. FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (J. Strachey trans. 1961)
(Germany 1930). In an illuminating passage, Freud expresses human sexuality in the
following words:
As regards the sexually mature individual, the choice of an object is restricted
to the opposite sex, and most extra-genital satisfactions are forbidden as per-
versions. The requirement, demonstrated in these prohibitions, that there shall
be a single kind of sexual life for everyone, disregards the dissimilarities,
whether innate 6r acquired, in the sexual constitution of human beings; it cuts
off a fair number of them from sexual enjoyment, and so becomes the source of
serious injustice.
Id. at 51.
ity. Individual liberty is threatened most when the legislature, by the
force of a criminal statute, imposes majoritarian morality upon all
members of a diverse community. This, in a secular state, is an ille-
gitimate use of coercive power.
This principle was epitomized in Wisconsin v. Yoder.94 The Court
declared: "A way of life that is odd or even erratic but interferes
with no rights or interests of others is not to be condemned because
it is different."' 9 5 In Yoder, the Amish children, it might have been
argued, were harmed by the deprivation of extended formal school-
ing. The Court, however, declined to impose upon the Amish, even if
their choices were odd or erratic, the majoritarian ideal of a good
life. Further, and no less significantly, the Court refused to "permit
the state to define as harmful anything it might deem undesirable."
96
The Yoder principle restates Mill's famous doctrine, "that the
only purpose for which power can rightfully be exercised over any
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent
harm to others. 97 This harm principle when applied to sexual activ-
ity curtails individual liberty to commit rape and other such acts
that inflict physical injury upon others. Nevertheless, it also limits
the reaches of popular sexual morality and allows consenting adults
to establish meaningful sexual relationships that are atypical but do
not hurt others.98
Only upon showing of a tangible harm can individual liberty be
limited. The mere distress caused "by the bare thought that others
are offending in private against [popular] morality cannot constitute
'harm,' except in a few neurotic or hypersensitive persons who are
literally 'made ill' by [homosexuality]." In Hardwick, the dissent-
ing Justices reaffirmed the harm principle when they stated that the
right to differ needs the most protection when individual "choices
upset the majority."' 00 Likewise, in O'Connor v. Donaldson,"'0 the
94. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
95. Id. at 224.
96. L. TRIBE, supra note 77, at 857.
97. 3S. MILL, supra note 86, at 13.
98. See H. HART, supra note 55, ch. 1.
99. Id. at 46. One may invoke the harm principle to argue that a state may law-
fully prohibit homosexual sodomy because homosexual activity poses a public health
threat due to the AIDS problem. This argument is fallacious. First, the AIDS virus is
gender neutral. It affects both homosexuals and heterosexuals. Thus individuals carrying
the virus make up a distinct class that presents a threat to public health. While the state
may arguably regulate sexual activity of those afflicted with the virus, it would be in-
defensible to prohibit sexual activity among people who do not carry the virus, be they
heterosexual or homosexual. Second, harm to public health is distinguishable from mere
moral harm. The harm principle recognizes that AIDS-related sexual activity may pose a
public health threat. But private sexual conduct that offends others in a moral sense only
cannot constitute a public health threat.
100. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2854.
101. 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975).
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Court upheld the harm principle and declared that "mere public in-
tolerance or animosity cannot constitutionally justify" involuntary
confinement of a mentally ill person who does not harm others.
There is no need to refute the harm principle by arguing that a
logical extension of the principle would allow individuals to engage
in consensual sexual acts even in public. In this regard, the old dis-
tinction between private immorality and public indecency limits the
logical excesses of the harm principle. 10 2 On grounds of public de-
cency, for example, state laws may properly prohibit people from
walking nude on the streets. But such laws would be overly coercive
if they punish people for walking bare in their living rooms."0 3
The moral majority has a legitimate argument that sexual acts
offensive to general feelings should not take place in public. But
when it stretches this argument to regulate private sexuality, it
clearly overstates the needs of popular morality and public decency.
The bare knowledge that individuals in their homes are acting in a
manner offensive to the moral majority does not confer on the moral
majority a right to be protected from such distress. "No social order
which accords to individual liberty any value could also accord the
right to be protected from distress thus occasioned. 1 4
This Article does not attempt to judge whether unconventional
sexual activity is morally good. Such moral judgments are legally
irrelevant. Nor is it argued that the public in general ought to ap-
prove of atypical sexual behavior. Criticisms, based on religious or
other moral grounds, of sodomy in general and even homosexual sod-
omy in particular, are protected under the first amendment. But any
102. See H. HART, supra note 55, at 44. Professor Hart states that the Romans
distinguished the province of the Censor, concerned with morals, from that of the Aedile,
concerned with public decency. In the sixth century, Islamic law made a similar distinc-
tion; the harsh punishment for fornication was inflicted only if the sexual act was done in
the presence of four male eye witnesses. Since rarely a private sexual act is done in the
presence of four men, an important consideration in punishing such an act was to curb
public indecency.
103. People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947
(1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981). The New York Court of Appeals declared
unconstitutional the New York statute that prohibited consensual sodomy. It made a
distinction between public indecency and private immorality by suggesting that an act
offensive to the majoritarian sentiments may be prohibited in public but not within the
precincts of a private setting. The court relied upon Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972) to show a similar distinction drawn by the Supreme Court of the United States
"between public dissemination of what might have been considered inimical to public
morality and individual recourse to the same material out of the public arena and in the
sanctum of the private home." Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d at 489, 415 N.E.2d at 941, 434
N.Y.S.2d at 952.
104. H. HART, supra note 55, at 46.
criticism based on conventional morality does not justify the launch-
ing of a legal crusade, 10 5 especially in a secular state, to outlaw atyp-
ical but consensual sexual activity among adult individuals in the
privacy of their homes. 106 In Palmore v. Sidoti,10 7 the Court stated:
"The Constitution cannot control [social] prejudices, but neither can
it tolerate them. Private biases may be outside the reach of the law,
but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect."' 08
In a secular, democratic society, the principle of ordered liberty
respects the moral, intellectual, spiritual and aesthetic uniqueness of
each individual; it forbids standardization of lifestyles and loathes
social duplicating of human beings. This has been our most powerful
argument against both theocratic and totalitarian regimes.
THE FULL WEIGHT OF THE CONSTITUTION
Under the full weight of the Constitution, the issue presented in
Hardwick should raise several constitutional questions. First,
whether the conduct prohibited by the Georgia statute falls within
the precincts of the right to privacy pronounced in the prior cases.
Second, whether the people have retained their right to make sexual
choices under the ninth amendment. Third, whether the severity of
the punishment prescribed by the statute is cruel and unusual under
the eighth amendment. Fourth, whether a discriminatory enforce-
ment of the statute only against homosexuals violates the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the fourteenth amendment.
In Hardwick, the Court declined to consider whether the statute
violates the eighth amendment, the ninth amendment or the Equal
Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment because Hardwick
had not invoked these grounds in his challenge to the statute in the
lower courts. Thus, the Court limited its analysis only to a few prin-
ciples of the Constitution to declare that Hardwick had no cogniza-
ble claim. The dissenting Justices, on the other hand, argued that the
procedural posture of the case required that the statute be struck
down if there was any constitutional ground available. 0 9
105. Both Ronald Dworkin and Graham Hughes have ably argued that the right
of the individual to make moral choices is protected against what the majoritarian pro-
cess would dictate. Dworkin, Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Morals, 75 YALE L.J.
986 (1966); Note, Morals and the Criminal Law, 71 YALE L.J. 662 (1962). See gener-
ally R. DWORKIN, supra note 55.
106. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d at 491, 415 N.E.2d at 942, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 952-53.
107. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
108. Id. at 433.
109. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2849 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). This case was
before the court on petitioner's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule
12(b)(6). Justice Blackmun stated that respondent is entitled to relief on any available
ground, even if he has not specifically relied upon that ground. He cited a number of
cases to show that it is a well settled principle of law that a complaint should not be
dismissed for its failure to rely upon a supportive legal theory and that a court is under a
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At this point, it will be instructive to draw a distinction between
thin and thick analysis of a constitutional issue.110 If a court decides
an issue by applying all relevart constitutional principles, then the
court is engaging in thick analysis. In other words, the thick analysis
resolves the issue under the full weight of the Constitution. But if the
court does not apply the full force of the Constitution and decides
the issue on the basis of only a few of the applicable constitutional
principles, then the court is engaging in thin analysis.
Ordinarily, a court may use thin analysis to resolve the question
presented if the litigants themselves have made no efforts to invoke
all the applicable rules and principles. The courts cannot prosecute
the case on behalf of the litigants. Nor can they assume the hercu-
lean task of resolving each constitutional issue on the basis of thick
analysis. The thin analysis may also be an appropriate judicial strat-
egy when the court has an intuitive sense that the result would not
be any different even if it engages in the thick analysis.
On the other hand, when the issue presented involves a claimed
fundamental liberty, the thin analysis can be justified only if the
court is certain that thick analysis would also yield a similar result.
It is suggested, however, that if the application of the full weight of
the Constitution would radically change the outcome of the case, the
court may decline to employ thin analysis. Two arguments are sub-
mitted in support of this suggestion.
First, thin analysis saves judicial time and energy. But when a
fundamental liberty is at issue, judicial economy becomes a second-
ary consideration. When the Supreme Court leaves out from consid-
eration important constitutional principles and is not certain how the
case would come out under the full impact of applicable constitu-
duty to examine the complaint to determine if relief can be given on any possible theory.
110. C. GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES (1973). Geertz explains the
concept of thick description to argue that culture is essentially a semiotic reality. "Believ-
ing, with Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he him-
self has spun, I take culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an
experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning." Id.
at 5. This explanation provides a useful insight into the constitutional scheme of pro-
tected liberties. The thick description of liberty presupposes the Constitution to be inter-
nally coherent and organic in meaning. Any interpretation of the Constitution that first
cuts it into pieces and then uses only a few threads to weave the concept of liberty indeed
tears off the intricate web of a seamless reality.
Professor Dworkin presents a similar theory to argue that judges while deciding hard
cases must take into consideration the whole character of the constitutional enterprise,
and not just a few selective rules. "The law may not be a seamless web; but the plaintiff
is entitled to ask Hercules [the most skillful judge] to treat it as if it were." R. DwoR-
KIN, supra note 55, at 116.
tional principles, the thin analysis is judicially uneconomical. Such
an analysis invites future litigation on essentially the same issue. For
instance, the question of homosexual activity can always appear
before the Court on the basis of the eighth amendment, the ninth
amendment and the Equal Protection Clause.
Second, even though certain liberties can be identified in specific
constitutional provisions, the concept of liberty is imbedded in the
organic design of the Constitution."'1 In other words, the Constitu-
tion as an internally coherent document embodies a thick concept of
liberty that cannot be read plainly from the text of the Constitution.
It follows that a claim involving a fundamental liberty that is not
specifically mentioned in the Constitution, such as the right to sexual
privacy, can be meaningfully settled only by applying the full weight
of the ConstitutioA. When the Court denies a claimed fundamental
liberty by using only cuts and pieces of the Constitution, it distorts
not only the jurisprudence of rights, but the organic nature of the
Constitution as well. Further, such thin analysis creates confusion
both in the general public and the legal profession, and makes it
difficult to understand what the Court is trying to achieve especially
when the Court is divided five to four.
The thin analysis used by the Hardwick Court seems unjustified
because a claimed fundamental liberty was at stake. It is highly
probable that the statute might have been struck down, if the Court
had applied the full weight of the Constitution. For instance, Justice
Powell, in his concurring opinion, indicated that the Georgia statute
posed "a serious Eighth Amendment issue." 1 2 The statute is equally
vulnerable under the ninth amendment and the Equal Protection
Clause. It is suggested that the Court take rights seriously. The thin




This Article draws four conclusions. First, the Supreme Court in
Bowers v. Hardwick twisted the issue in order to single out homosex-
uals for unjustified moral condemnation. It used moral rhetoric to
deny them their claimed right to sexual privacy. Second, the Court
upheld a criminal statute although it inflicts special harm on a politi-
cally disadvantaged group. Third, the Court's analysis is indefensible
because the right to sexual privacy is rooted both in this Nation's
history and tradition. It is also implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty. Fourth, the Court's use of thin analysis to deny a claimed
111. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 55, at 131-49.
112. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2847 (Powell, J., concurring).
113. Id. at 2850 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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fundamental liberty creates confusing jurisprudence. Thus, the stat-
ute held to be constitutional on the basis of thin analysis might well
turn out to be unconstitutional on the basis of thick analysis.

